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Generation in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implications for Public Debt and 
Transition to Renewable Energy 
Seife Ayele and Vianney Mutyaba  
November 2021 
Summary 
While China has been increasingly contributing to the recent growth in electricity 
generation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the effects of China-funded investment 
on host countries’ debt burden and transition to renewable energy sources have 
not been sufficiently explored. Drawing on secondary data, combined with deep 
dive studies of Ethiopia and Uganda, this paper shows that despite significant 
liberalisation of the power sector in SSA, Chinese investments in the electricity 
industry continue to follow state-led project contract-based models. We show 
that this approach has failed to encourage Chinese firms to build compelling 
investment portfolios for competitive procurements within the region and, instead 
and inadvertently, it has exacerbated the debt burden of host country 
governments. In spite of the global drive towards climate resilient energy 
generation, Chinese funding of electricity generation in SSA is not sufficiently 
channelled towards modern renewable energy sources such as wind and solar 
power that could reduce vulnerability to climate change. While recognising that 
the private sector-led competitive model of power generation is not without 
limitations, we argue that SSA’s electricity generation strategy that leads to less 
public debt and more climate resilience involves increased involvement of 
Chinese investment in the competitive model, with more diversification of such 
investment portfolios towards modern renewables such as wind and solar energy 
resources.  
Keywords 
Chinese-financing; renewable energy; electricity generation; public debt; climate 
change; independent power producers; China; Ethiopia; Uganda; sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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Africa has rich but largely untapped energy resources. It has well over 10 
terawatts (TW) of solar potential, 350 gigawatts (GW) of hydroelectric, 110GW of 
wind and an additional 15GW of geothermal (AfDB 2015). However, electricity 
consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stands at 483-kilowatt hour 
(kWh), which is very low compared to other regions. South Asia, for example, 
stands at 707 kWh and the Middle East and North Africa at 1,687 kWh (Blimpo 
and Cosgrove-Davies 2019). Although estimates vary, close to 600 million 
people in Africa (representing about 48 per cent of the continent’s population of 
nearly 1.2bn) still have no access to power (IRENA 2019; IEA 2020).  
Fuelled by economic growth (notably since the turn of the century) and 
population growth, demand for electricity is growing fast and it is estimated that it 
will increase by 100 per cent in the period 2018–30 (IRENA 2019). The African 
Development Bank (AfDB 2019) estimates that Africa needs approximately 
US$32–40bn annual investment in electricity between 2018 and 2030. Low 
levels of electricity generation and use have been impeding socio-economic 
development in the region, and SSA cannot run its homes and businesses 
unless it unlocks its huge renewable energy potential (AfDB 2015). 
The low level of supply is linked to multiple factors, including a lack of generating 
capacity, and limited transmission and distribution infrastructure. Drought and 
climate change have also been increasingly threatening generation from 
hydropower (IEA 2014; World Bank 2018). Additionally, poor electricity supply 
reduces utility revenues, makes it more difficult to increase tariffs, and thereby 
constrains the availability of finance for investment (IEA 2014). 
National and global commitments for transitioning energy to low carbon emission 
technologies to mitigate and combat the adverse impacts of climate change have 
recently increased (see for example, Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué 
2021). In recent years, the emphasis for the majority of foreign direct 
investments has been on renewable energy and endeavours to align 
development of electricity infrastructure to the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals. The Economic Commission of Africa actively supports the 
transition from carbon-intensive and unsustainable technologies to clean and 
renewable technologies (UNECA 2014; IEA 2020). Commitments include 
attainment of net zero emissions no later than 2050, halving collective emissions 
over the two decades by 2030, increasing climate finance, and reaffirming 
commitment to the Paris Agreement (Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué 
2021). 
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As we will show below, China has become a dominant force in the African 
electricity industry (Eberhard et al. 2016; Eberhard et al. 2017; Lema et al. 2021). 
But any investment in the sector, we argue, needs to address the perennial 
problems of lack of access to finance and the risk of utilities, and by extension 
SSA countries, becoming overly indebted. These have been major challenges 
and the subject of reform agendas in many SSA countries (World Bank 2018; 
Shendy, Kaplan and Mousley 2011). Consequently, many SSA governments 
have been addressing their investment needs through multiple mechanisms 
including their own resources, such as taxes and user charges, bilateral and 
multilateral donors, and development finance institutions (Eberhard et al. 2016). 
Yet many commentators have forcefully underlined the importance of private 
finance for investment – which comes via electricity procurement by independent 
power suppliers (Eberhard et al. 2016). Related to this, over the past decade, 
two models of financing have prevailed in SSA: Chinese investment following the 
so-called Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) model, and 
investment by independent power producers (IPP) (Eberhard et al. 2016; 
Eberhard et al. 2017). While arguably IPPs encourage cost discovery and 
reduction (IRENA and CEM 2015; Eberhard et al, 2016), the EPC model has 
been favoured by Chinese investors (see, for example, Eberhard et al. 2016) 
leading Africa to make a significant addition to power generation in the region 
(Eberhard et al. 2016) – to a total of 7.5GW in installed capacity, most of which 
was added between 2009–14. While 63 per cent of this comprised of large 
hydropower projects, only 3 per cent came from wind power (Eberhard et al. 
2017: 392). Due in part to this investment, the electricity access rate for SSA has 
improved from 23 per cent in 2000 to 32 per cent in 2012 (IEA 2014, 2020).  
Our analysis of the phenomenal increase in Chinese investment and contribution 
is situated within the ‘China in Africa’ debate which has documented the 
historical context of Chinese engagement in Africa, notably since the late 1970s, 
and the multiple features of China’s investment in (or engagement with) Africa 
(see, for example, Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Gu 2009; Mohan 2013; 
Chiyemura 2019). This paper, however, propels the debate to the present, 
looking at some less explored areas of Chinese involvement in African electricity 
generation – its effects on public debt and transition to more diverse renewable 
energy sources.  
We refer to ‘Chinese investment’ to mean investment capital originating in China, 
often channelled through Chinese businesses – state or privately owned, or 
some combination of both – to implement projects in SSA. Such investment is 
often backed by the so-called ‘Chinese policy banks’ (Shen and Power 2017; 
Lema et al. 2021). This resonates with what Kaplinsky and Morris (2009), Lema 
et al. (2021) and others call the ‘Chinese model’ – characterised by designing, 
constructing and delivering (turnkey) projects, deploying labour and equipment 
imported from China. The financing of such projects comes in a package of long-
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term concessionary loans to host countries from Chinese policy banks such as 
EXIM Bank. The Chinese firms are thus not ‘investors’ in the classic sense, nor 
do they own project assets.  
Lema et al. (2021) is among recent studies on such investment in SSA and 
found that Chinese firms acting as main contractors accounted for 30 per cent of 
new capacity additions in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these projects, 56 per cent 
were in renewable energy, with the vast majority in hydropower, but increasingly 
also in wind and solar energy. Lema et al.’s in-depth analysis of economic co-
benefits created when renewable-energy projects were developed by Chinese 
investors showed the rather limited outcomes of Chinese investment on local 
jobs and content use (Lema et al. 2021). Shen and Power (2017) and Tan-
Mullins, Urban and Mang (2017) showed multiple drivers of Chinese investment 
in Africa. Departing from earlier narratives, for example, around ‘China’s growing 
need for resources’ (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009), these recent studies highlight 
the desire of Chinese firms for global positioning, backed by the Chinese 
government’s ‘going out’ strategy, increasing domestic competition within China, 
and the declining number of investment opportunities in China as key drivers. 
Profit-seeking motivation was also a central feature (Tan-Mullins et al. 2017).  
Finally, Chiyemura (2019), based on his in-depth study of two wind farms in 
Ethiopia, showed that Chinese investors complete projects quickly and at low 
cost. He also showed the willingness of China to reschedule and/or cancel debt, 
offering loans at concessionary rates (Chiyemura 2019). He argues that Chinese 
investment improves infrastructure and increases revenue for Ethiopia, with huge 
socio-economic and developmental implications (Chiyemura 2019). As clearly 
highlighted by Chiyemura (2019), African partners are not passive recipients of 
Chinese investment either. Chiyemura articulates that Ethiopians, for example, 
through their policies, were the main drivers of the development of their rich 
resources (such as wind) and were tapping into a range of global renewable 
energy technologies.  
While significant research has been conducted on electricity generation through 
Chinese investment, these studies have paid little attention to the effects of such 
investment on utilities and host government debts and building climate resilient 
energy systems. This paper therefore aims to fill this gap, and address the 
following overarching questions: what is the trend and structure of Chinese 
investments in the SSA power sectors, and how does this compare with 
financing by independent power producers in the region? What are the 
implications of such investment on utilities and host government debts, and 
building climate resilient energy systems in SSA?  
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1.2 Research methodology 
Chinese investment in electricity generation is unevenly spread across sub-
Saharan Africa (IEA 2014: 24) but, as noted above, in many countries it has 
made major impacts, particularly in countries where such investment has been 
actively taken up. We use data from secondary sources generated from 
international organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) at SSA level, coupled with 
deep dive case studies of Ethiopia and Uganda – two countries that have 
attracted significant Chinese investment. Over the past 10 or so years, Ethiopia 
has implemented several Chinese-financed projects, including the first early wind 
farms in Africa (Chiyemura 2019). But despite plenty of opportunities, Chinese 
investment has shied away from being involved in Ethiopia’s recently developing 
IPPs. On the other hand, Uganda was among the first SSA countries to 
undertake energy reform (Godinho and Eberhard 2019) and hosts the second 
largest number of IPPs in SSA after South Africa (Eberhard et al. 2016). Uganda 
also has significant Chinese-financed projects in the electricity sector, with two 
large hydropower plants developed by the Chinese. Ethiopia and Uganda 
therefore constitute rich cases for exploring the effects of Chinese investments in 
the region. 
1.3 Organisation of the paper 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents and analyses data on 
electricity generation in SSA, specifically looking at the contribution of Chinese 
finance. Sections 3 and 4 present the energy sector power reforms and the 
status of power generation capacities in Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively. It 
discusses Chinese financed projects in both countries and implications for 
national debt and climate change. Finally, section 5 comprises the discussion 
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2. Sub-Saharan Africa electricity 
sector and its financing 
2.1 Evolution and status of the African electricity 
sector 
Prior to the year 2000, investment in electricity generation in many SSA countries 
was the preserve of governments – often financed through budgetary allocations 
and sovereign debt, including concessionary loans from development finance 
institutions (Meyer, Eberhard and Gratwick 2018; Wamukonya 2005). The SSA 
state dominance in electricity development during the period 1990–2001 meant 
that the private sector accounted for only 13 per cent of investment in Africa’s 
electricity sector (Wamukonya 2005). SSA governments struggled to mobilise 
financing - as Eberhard et al. (2016) show, investment in electricity generation was 
not only low but narrowly focused on South Africa. Between 1990–2013, only 
24.85GW of new generation capacity was added across SSA, of which 9.2GW or 
37 per cent was accounted for by South Africa. Over the same period, investments 
in new power generation capacity reached approximately US$45.6bn, of which 
US$14.3bn (or 31 per cent) was accounted for by South Africa. Eberhard et al. 
(2016) also show that, of the total investment of US$31.3bn over 1990–2013, IPPs 
and Chinese investment accounted for 22 per cent and 16 per cent respectively, 
while the remainder was contributed by national governments and utilities (51 per 
cent) and international financial institutions (11 per cent).  
Insufficient public funds, coupled with poor performance of state utilities, forced 
many governments in SSA to change their financing approach (Meyer et al. 2018). 
Consequently, many countries undertook structural and policy reforms, including 
the unbundling of vertically integrated state corporations, liberalisation of the 
sector and establishment of independent regulatory bodies, in order to encourage 
private sector participation (Eberhard et al. 2016; Meyer et al. 2018). Eberhard et 
al. (2016) underlines that by 2014, more than half of SSA countries had 
established a regulatory agency. As we will show below, Uganda and Ethiopia 
were among those countries that implemented such policy reforms.  
In many SSA countries, the energy sector reform aimed to attract private sector 
investments – which require an enabling environment offering long-term 
investment certainty. This meant implementing policies that guaranteed the full 
recovery of costs through end-user tariffs (Meyer et al. 2018). Cost reflective tariff 
reforms became central to attracting private investment, but present stiff 
challenges as they can overburden the majority of household consumers who are 
poor and less able to pay for their electricity bills (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 
2019). 
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2.2 China as a bridge financier 
2.2.1  Growth in Chinese financing of SSA power projects 
Over the past two decades, power sector reforms in SSA have been primarily 
driven by the need to attract private financing for investments in energy 
infrastructure to boost the limited generation capacity and enhance electrification 
rates, amidst insufficient public funds and historical underperformance by state 
owned utilities (Meyer et al. 2018; Wamukonya 2005). However, despite the 
optimistic outlook on reform, privatisation has not been successful at attracting 
affordable private capital in many SSA power sectors (Eberhard et al. 2016). 
Infrastructure development requires large upfront financing – with investment 
repayment spread over a larger base and longer periods, which is difficult for 
SSA. Consequently, many countries in SSA developed a negative perception 
towards private sector participation and investment (Wamukonya 2005). In order 
to address power generation financing requirements, and at the same time 
ensure low retail electricity tariffs, many SSA governments looked to Chinese 
financed EPC projects (Eberhard et al. 2016). Moreover, as Africa attracted 
private investment to develop generation capacity, China did not participate in 
the IPP programmes (Power Futures Lab 2020). As shown in Eberhard et al 
(2016), as most African countries were unable to finance their power needs, the 
financing of electricity generation capacity increasingly shifted to Chinese 
financed EPC models. Eberhard et al. (2016) state that while many SSA 
countries had previously procured generation capacity through competitive 
procurement and its attendant benefits, when it came to China, many SSA 
countries preferred direct negotiations.  
Statistics are limited and varied, but in recent years China has clearly emerged 
as the leader in Africa’s power sector developments, accounting for 60 per cent 
of investments in SSA power projects (Lema et al. 2021). Lema et al. (2021) 
reported Chinese investments in Africa of US$30bn, including North Africa and 
all sources of energy (of this amount, US$13bn was deployed for renewable 
projects in 37 countries)1. Power Futures Lab (2020) reports that the value of 
Chinese investments in power generation in SSA is now more than investments 
by typical IPPs. Chinese financing has increased from US$0 (zero) in 1997 to 
almost US$6bn in 2018, compared to US$4bn by IPPs during the same period 
(Power Futures Lab 2020).  
According to Acker, Brautigam and Huang (2021), China is Africa’s largest 
bilateral creditor responsible for at least 21 per cent of African debt – and 
payments to China account for nearly 30 per cent of 2021’s debt service. The 
 
1 In the same vein, Cabré, Gallagher and Li (2018) provides an estimate of US$216bn since 2000, inclusive 
of investments in fossil fuels and renewable energy. 
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World Bank and other multilaterals are responsible for 20 per cent of African 
debt. Estimates also show that one-third of countries in SSA were either in or at 
risk of debt distress even before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has 
since worsened (Coulibaly 2021).  
International financial institutions such the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
estimate that SSA will need an additional $345bn through 2023. Accordingly, 38 
countries in SSA are eligible for relief under the G20’s debt service suspension 
initiative. Growing debt, therefore, suggests that the bilateral country to country 
approach used by China to finance power projects in SSA may not be 
sustainable in the medium to long term (Acker, Brautigam and Huang 2021; 
Coulibaly 2021).  
The growth of Chinese finance in the power sector needs to be seen in context 
and as a continuation of growth in overall trade and investment in SSA. Since 
2000, China has emerged as Africa’s largest trading partner (Chen, Dollar and 
Tang 2018). According to the China Africa Research Initiative (2021), the value 
of China-Africa trade in 2019 was US$192bn, up from US$185bn in 2018. With 
respect to power generation, the IEA (2016) states that Chinese investment is 
responsible for 30 per cent of new generation capacity in SSA between 2010 
and 2015, and Chinese firms built 17GW of generation capacity in SSA between 
2010 and 2020. On the other hand, Shen (2020) asserts that Chinese power 
development companies have moved into SSA because of the saturated 
Chinese domestic market and competition from project developers from Europe 
and US markets. 
2.2.2 Chinese financing of renewable energy projects 
China is the powerhouse of renewable energy technologies, notably solar energy 
technologies. Eight of the top 10 world suppliers are Chinese, yet China has 
made limited contribution to harnessing Africa’s renewable energy (Ayele et al. 
2021). Whereas China has investment in power generation in SSA across the 
different technologies, most projects and capacity is invested in large 
hydropower plants (Eberhard et al. 2017; IEA 2016), as illustrated in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 below. Other statistics by International Rivers (2019, as cited in Lema et 
al. 2021) indicates that there are more than 85 hydropower projects financed by 
China in Africa. 
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Figure 2.1 Number of Chinese power generation 
projects in SSA 
Source: Authors’ own. Computation based on Eberhardt et al. (2017) 
Figure 2.2 Installed capacity of Chinese generation 
projects in SSA (MW) 
Source: Authors’ own. Computation based on Eberhard et al. (2017)  
The dominance of large hydropower plant development is confirmed by Lema et 
al. (2021) – Chinese investors accounted for 60 per cent of hydropower 
investments in SSA. But the Chinese appetite for investments in solar and wind 
power generation in SSA has not been as high as the exhibited interest for these 
technologies within China. By 2017, China had developed 19 large hydropower 
plants, four small hydropower plants, three wind plants, and zero solar projects in 
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(2016), in SSA countries small renewable energy projects are increasingly 
procured through auctions and renewable energy feed-in-tariffs (REFIT) – 
though the results have been disappointing, with relatively few projects 
developed. However, for the reasons we discuss below, Chinese firms have not 
been responsive to competitive procurement of power plants in SSA. Shen 
(2020) notes that whereas Africa has transitioned to competitive bidding 
systems, China still prefers direct bilateral negotiations with Africa rather than 
open bidding and auction schemes, even in countries where auction and REFIT 
frameworks exist.  
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3. Chinese investment in the 
Ethiopian energy sector 
3.1 The Ethiopian energy sector: drivers of reform 
and current status 
With over 117 million inhabitants in 2021, Ethiopia is the second most populous 
country in Africa after Nigeria. Its government is a federal parliamentary republic, 
with 10 self-governing regions. About 80 per cent of Ethiopians live in rural 
areas. From early 2000, the government embraced the ‘developmental state’ 
approach and played an active role in the economy, implementing two 
successive Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP-I and GTP-II) (Ayele 2021). 
For most of the past two decades, the Ethiopian economy registered double digit 
growth, averaging 9.9 per cent a year from 2007/8–17/18. Currently classified as 
a low-income economy by the World Bank, Ethiopia aims to attain low middle-
income country status by 2025 (Ayele 2021). Following Abiy Ahmed’s taking the 
premiership position in 2018, the party that ruled Ethiopia for nearly three 
decades – the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front – was 
dissolved in 2019 and replaced by the Prosperity Party. Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed and the Prosperity Party continue the liberalisation of the electricity 
sector, including procuring electricity through Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs) (MoFEC 2017). 
For over 120 years, Ethiopia has been generating electricity, but by the end of 
the twentieth century its capacity had never exceeded 1,000MW (MoWIE 2019). 
Successive reforms have been undertaken to address perennial challenges 
(MoWIE 2019; Teferra 2002).  
First, in 1997, the state-owned Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority 
(ELPA) was split into the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo), to 
generate, transmit, distribute, and sell electricity; and the Ethiopian Electricity 
Authority (EEA), to regulate the sector. The reform made EEPCo seemingly 
independent of its line ministry, to reduce bureaucratic delays in key decision 
making and determine tariff rates based on commercial principles. Second, in 
2013, there was a further restructuring of the state energy company and EEPCo 
was unbundled into the Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP) and Ethiopian Electric 
Utility (EEU) (Baker et al. 2021, forthcoming). In the same vein, in 2017, a public 
private partnership (PPP) mechanism was put in place to promote private sector 
investment in the power sector and facilitate the implementation of privately 
financed infrastructure projects, including procuring renewable energy from 
independent power producers (RE-IPP) (MoFEC 2017). Finally, many allied 
reforms have been undertaken, including quality service improvement in revenue 
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collection, electricity tariff reforms, and capacity building programmes (MoWIE 
2019). 
The above reforms were precipitated by a range of drivers (World Bank 2018; 
MoWIE 2019): 
• Increased demand for investment – utility companies were dependent on 
public finances with a high level of indebtedness. 
• Limited ability to switch to non-hydropower renewable sources and meet 
ambitious targets in GTPs. 
• Unreformed tariff rates which failed to reflect production costs and 
demand. 
• Droughts and climate change threatening generation from hydropower 
sources. 
• A growing need to transition towards a cleaner energy system, as nearly 
80 per cent of the population were dependent on unsustainable traditional 
biomass energy sources. 
Reform measures have started to pay off – for example, generation capacity 
grew from 380MW in 1991 to 850MW in 2009 and reached 4,413MW in 2020 
(MoWIE 2019; MoWIE 2020; Tesfamichael et al. 2021). With the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and other major projects in the pipeline, 
Ethiopia is set to generate 21,238MW by 2030 (MoWIE 2020). However, despite 
being endowed with abundant renewable resources, only 44 per cent of over 117 
million Ethiopians have access to electricity, and this gives Ethiopia the second 
largest electricity access deficit in SSA (MoWIE 2019). Yet Ethiopia aims to 
reach 100 per cent by 2025 – if realised, this will mean achieving Goal 7 of the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals (‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all’) five years early.  
3.2 Chinese investment in Ethiopian electricity 
sector 
Ethiopia has abundant and diverse renewable energy resources in hydropower, 
solar, geothermal, and wind energy (MoWIE 2019), but it has not sufficiently 
exploited its resource advantage. For example, it has 45,000MW exploitable 
hydropower, but use remains below 10 per cent of potential (MoWIE 2019). 
Exploitation of the huge potential of solar, geothermal, and wind sources is 
negligible. Consequently, Ethiopia’s energy supply is highly dependent on 
biomass resources – firewood and agricultural waste (MoWIE 2018).  
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Table 3.1 Some major Chinese-financed energy 






























2007 97MW C-EXIM 155 75% 
Adama I – 
wind 
2009 51MW C-EXIM 117 85% 

















ICBC 1888 25% 
Genale-
Dawa 3 – 
hydro 
2010 254MW C-EXIM 455 60% 
Genale-














94.7   
Total   975MW  3669.7  
Sources: Authors’ own. Created using data from Chiyemura (2019) and unpublished 2020 data from 
Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP). 
 
2 Note that many more projects built (or planned) with finance from International Finance Institutions and 
own sources are not listed here. 
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Spearheaded by EEP, several electricity generation projects have been 
completed, and many more are in the pipeline. Table 3.1 above shows partial 
data where Chinese finance has had some effects. Table 3.1 indicates that:  
• Power generation has picked up over the past two decades, with Chinese 
businesses involved in the generation of at least 975MW (out of 4,413MW 
recent generation capacity). 
• Chinese business involvement was mainly in hydro projects, with some in 
wind plants. 
• Six hydro projects: Tekeze (300MW), Finchaa-Amerti-Neshe (97MW), 
Gibe III (1870MW), Genale-Dawa (254MW), Genale-Dawa (transmission 
project) and Aba Samuel Dam.  
• Two wind farms: Adama I (51MW), Adama II (153MW)  
• The share of Chinese investment in total project varied but, except for the 
Genale-Dawa transmission project where it was over 60 per cent. In all 
three wind plants, Chinese finance accounted for 85 per cent. 
• For the above projects, Chinese investment exceeded $US2bn.  
• EEP (and by extension the Government of Ethiopia) is liable for the loan. 
This is because EEP (the Government) own the dams and wind plants. 
Chinese companies, as per EPC agreement, only design, construct, and 
deliver the projects to EEP.  
The foregoing clearly indicates the significance of the contribution made by 
Chinese businesses to electricity generation in Ethiopia. It also indicates how 
Chinese investments have added to the debt burden of the utility company and 
the government. When the privatisation agenda was pushed but garnered little 
interest from private sector finance, China stepped in and eased the financial 
pressure, but inadvertently added to the debt burden. Debt has become 
unsustainable and there have been high level debt rescheduling discussions 
between Ethiopian and Chinese governments officials. Fox (2019) reported that 
the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed opened up such negotiations with 
China to restructure previous deals. In September 2018, he reached an 
agreement with China to restructure the repayment period of loans from 10 to 30 
years (Fox 2019)3. 
Section five will discuss the reasons why Chinese businesses prefer EPC 
projects that lead to public debt for host governments like Ethiopia, but here we 
make two conclusions: first, Ethiopia’s electric sector reform primarily focused on 
procurement of electricity from diverse resources and suppliers. While China 
 
3 Significant debt - state policy banks extended it to more than $12.1bn since 2000, according to the China 
Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University of the United States (Fox 2019). 
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responded well – through increased engagement in the Ethiopian energy market 
– its investment was limited to undertaking EPC contracts. In doing so, it 
exacerbated the debt burden of the treasury and offtaker. Second, although 
Chinese businesses have entered the wind farm sector, thus far they have shied 
away from utility level energy generation from solar and geothermal resources.  
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4. Chinese investment in Uganda’s 
energy sector 
4.1 The Ugandan energy sector: drivers of reform 
and current status 
Uganda, a landlocked country in East Africa, has a population of 44.27 million 
(Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019). According to UBOS (2020), 76 per cent of 
the Ugandan population live in rural areas, and the gross domestic product 
(GDP) annual growth rate in Uganda averaged 5 per cent from 2009–20. The 
World Bank classifies Uganda as a low-income country. In 2018, 51 per cent of 
Ugandan households had access to at least one source of electricity, with 24 per 
cent of households accessing it through the national grid, and 27 per cent 
accessing it through off-grid solutions (UBOS 2018).  
The Uganda electricity sector faced an energy crisis in the 1990s, in the 
aftermath of the challenges of the 1971–86 emergency period and declining 
water levels in Lake Victoria (Meyer et al. 2018). The government initiated a 
reform programme in the late 1990s seeking to address the pressing issues 
faced by the electricity supply industry. Before this reform process began, the 
industry predominantly consisted of the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) which 
had been the publicly owned vertically integrated utility since 1948 and had a 
monopoly in providing generation, transmission, and distribution of electric 
power. It also had export agreements with some neighbouring countries, as well 
as a regulatory role. The performance of UEB was perceived to be inadequate, 
resulting in an industry that was underfinanced and delivering poor service. 
Uganda became the first country in SSA to unbundle generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity (Eberhard et al. 2016). The reforms came with the 
backdrop of slow growth in investments in the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) – 
mainly the generation infrastructure and the associated transmission and 
distribution infrastructure, and the need to improve the financial sustainability and 
operational efficiency of the ESI. The main drivers justifying the need for reform 
have been described as (MEMD 2002; Meyer et al. 2018): 
• Low electricity sector efficiency, characterised by (a) high level of system 
losses (up to 38 per cent), and (b) unreliable and poor quality of power 
supply constraining business development. 
• Very low coverage and poor access to the grid. 
• The UEB’s inability to service its debts.  
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• The need for private sector-led economic growth, resulting in the desire to   
minimise monopoly power. 
• The need to attract private capital.  
The core reform and restructuring process initiated by the 1999 Electricity Act 
took some six years to implement. In 2000, the Electricity Regulatory Authority 
(ERA) was established, and in 2001, the formal unbundling of UEB commenced. 
In 2002, the Energy Policy described above was published to support the 1999 
Electricity Act and facilitate private investment (MEMD 2002). The state-owned 
corporation, UEB, was unbundled into three distinct corporations to oversee the 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity on behalf of government. 
The distribution and generation assets were respectively privatised to Umeme 
Limited in 2005 and Eskom Uganda limited in 2003, marking the entry of 
independent power producers in Uganda’s ESI (Meyer et al. 2018). Even as the 
reforms took root and inefficiencies were tackled through privatisation, there was 
some inertia in investments in generation capacity. In order to address 
generation capacity shortages, Uganda competitively procured Bujagali 
Hydropower Plant. When Bujagali Hydropower Plant was commissioned in 
August 2012, it helped avert loading shedding and provided replacement 
generation from the expensive thermal plants. The commissioning of Bujagali 
Hydropower Plant, the eventual reduction of direct electricity subsidies, as well 
as restructuring of the investment framework with the review of Feed-In-Tariffs 
(FiTs), created the impetus to attract investment in renewable energy production 
(Meyer et al. 2018; Eberhard et al. 2016). 
Like many SSA countries, since 2007 has Uganda implemented REFIT to attract 
private investment in renewable energy. It also procured solar plants under a 
competitive tendering programme. Eberhard et al. (2016) states that whereas 
critics argued that the Uganda electricity supply industry was too small to reap 
the benefits of the reforms, they are now bearing fruit (Figure 4.1). The number 
of IPPs in Uganda increased from three in 1999 to 47 in 2020. Uganda has 
attracted IPPs on account of its stable regulatory framework that ensures cost 
reflective tariffs, and a streamlining of the licensing process. Godinho and 
Eberhard (2019) noted that Uganda is one of the few SSA countries with close to 
cost reflective tariffs. In Uganda, before 2012, the electricity retail tariff was 
heavily subsidised, with the government paying 56 per cent of the costs. 
According to Eberhard et al. (2016), the establishment of a regulator is an 
enabling factor for boosting IPP investments.  
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Figure 4.1 Number of Ugandan IPPs, 1999-2020 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using data from Electricity Regulatory Authority (2021). 
The effects of the reform measures have been reflected in Uganda’s installed 
capacity, which increased from 394.9MW in 2009 to 1,268MW in 2020 and is 
expected to reach over 2,000MW by mid-2022, with the commissioning of the 
Karuma Hydropower Plant. The distribution energy losses reduced from 33 per 
cent in 2005 to 16.4 per cent in 2019, and revenue collection has increased from 
82.8 per cent in 2005 to 100 per cent by 2019.  
4.2 Chinese investment in Uganda energy sector 
Following the commissioning of Bujagali Hydropower Plant in 2012 and 
subsequently other IPPs, Uganda noted that the generation tariffs for IPPs, and 
by extension the resultant retail tariffs, were not supporting the country’s 
industrialisation aspirations. Despite government’s efforts, the private sector 
attached high risk to investment in the sector and demanded high generation 
tariffs, contrary to government expectation. However, without reversing its policy 
to attract private investment, Uganda turned to China to finance development of 
the 183MW Isimba hydropower project (commissioned in March 2019), and the 
600MW Karuma hydropower project (to be commissioned in June 2022). Unlike 
the 250MW Bujagali Hydropower Plant, the Isimba and Karuma plants were 
contracted through bilateral direct negotiations between Uganda and China4. As 
part of the project structure, the EPC contractor was from China, the loans were 
from China Exim Bank, and Uganda was required to make a 15 per cent upfront 
contribution to the EPC costs (Meyer et al. 2018).  
 
4 Here we note that, despite active participation in Uganda power generation, China has not participated in 
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Table 4.1 Chinese-financed energy sector projects 
in Uganda 
 

























Source: Authors’ own. Created using data from Meyer et al. (2018) and Eberhard et al. (2016) 
Clearly reforms helped the Ugandan electricity sector to attract investments and 
increase generation capacity. Table 4.1 shows the projects with direct Chinese 
involvement and financing in power generation in Uganda. The electricity sector 
has a good mix of typical IPP projects and Chinese funded generation projects, 
but the latter are focused on hydro projects. By mid-2022, China is expected to 
have invested over US$1.917bn in Ugandan power generation and will be 
contributing 39 per cent of the country’s power installed capacity. China also 
participated in Ugandan power generation as an EPC contractor and equipment 
manufacturer for power plants not directly financed by China. Whereas it is 
uncontested that China has made a significant contribution to the Ugandan 
power sector, it has also contributed to the Ugandan debt burden, as in many 
other SSA countries. According to the IMF, the Ugandan debt to GDP ratio was 
44.81 per cent in 2020, largely due to borrowing from China for infrastructure 
development. As far as Chinese finance in the energy sector is concerned, the 
Ugandan government is the borrower and carries the obligation of repaying the 
loan, supplemented by revenue from the projects. In order to ensure loan 
repayment, the government is required to allocate funds every fiscal year 
through the National Budget for debt service. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
The evidence we generated at SSA level and from Ethiopia and Uganda show 
that Chinese finance has provided the much-needed investments to bridge the 
financing gaps in the SSA power infrastructure, and significantly contributed to 
the expansion of the region’s power generation capacity. However, Chinese 
finance has also, inadvertently, exacerbated the fragile external public debt 
situation of SSA. Ethiopia and Uganda each owe at least US$2bn to their 
Chinese financiers. Second, despite China’s unparalleled financial and 
technological capabilities in renewables such solar and wind technologies (Lema 
et al. 2021; Ayele et al. 2021), Chinese finance predominantly went to 
hydropower generation, which is vulnerable to climate change (and, at worst, 
coal-based electricity generation – which is the single biggest contributor to 
environmental pollution and climate change). At the heart of our conclusion was 
that the EPC model was pursued by Chinese businesses, China predominantly 
invests in hydropower projects, and does not participate in competitive 
procurement as it prefers country bilateral negotiations. But why do Chinese 
business prefer EPC projects that lead to debt for host governments? Based on 
the evidence we analysed, and complemented by other studies (such as Lema 
et al. 2021; Ayele et al. 2021), we offer the following explanations and 
conclusions: 
Lower transaction costs and bureaucracy: Electricity generation though IPPs 
is subject to a long, and transparent, process of auctions, but EPC projects 
appear to be quick to start moving. Moreover, under the IPP model, project 
finance relies on project generated finance which creates incentives for host 
countries to reform the power supply value chain before the investment is signed 
up (to ensure financial sustainability), hence this model may have the effect of 
delaying project implementation. However, Chinese businesses engaged in 
renewables appear to be on a learning curve and, despite having unprecedented 
technological capabilities, they have not previously engaged in the competitive 
(IPP) power generation model. They appear to prefer the EPC model, which 
does not necessarily require competition and a commitment to transparency 
procedures for approval. A widely reported case (see, for example, Meyer et al. 
2018) reaffirms our claim here. Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, used the 
2013 Durban BRICS conference and a meeting with Chinese President Xi 
Jinping to award the Karuma plant to Sinohydro and the Isimba to CWE. Meyer 
et al. (2018) states that the award to Sinohydro came as a surprise, as the 
company had never been a short-listed bidder for Karuma, and it remains 
unclear on which assessments the award was obtained. Overall, because lower 
transaction costs are involved, Chinese EPC model projects give the impression 
of being cheaper compared to projects finance by IPPs. Under IPP project 
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finance, the lenders require that equity is drawn first and fully before the loan. 
The accrued compounded equity during construction increases project 
development costs. In the case of many Chinese EPC model projects, as our 
evidence from Ethiopia and Uganda show, governments raise about 15 per cent 
upfront finance which does not attract interest during construction. 
Risk allocation: Project development risks (construction delays, cost overruns, 
licensing, etc.) and project operation risks (such as revenue risk, supplier risk, 
and foreign exchange risk) apply to both Chinese-financed EPC projects and IPP 
projects. However, under the Chinese EPC model, EPC contractors are not 
required to do the so-called BOOTs – build, own, operate and transit – 
arrangements. The debt burden is negotiated government-to-government, or 
with respective government agencies. Chinese-funded EPCs are typically 
handed over to SSA government or government-appointed utilities at commercial 
operations date. This risk allocation framework explains why China prefers the 
EPC model for infrastructure projects in SSA. That said, Chinese-financed power 
generation investments are not immune to the project development risks of 
construction. The facts suggest that many projects in SSA (whether financed 
through IPPs or EPC finance) have experienced cost overruns and project 
delays. This is notwithstanding the fact that the interest rates for Chinese-
financed power plants are much lower than the interest rates for traditional 
project finance IPPs. In deciding financing of power projects, SSA policy makers 
should consider the costing of Chinese-financed projects beyond the interest 
rates provided in the loan agreements and consider the fiscal impact of the 
financing and national debt sustainability.  
Local level development and capacity building: Studies (see, for example, 
Lema et al. 2021) show rather limited stakeholder engagement, limited 
consultation between local actors and Chinese businesses, and limited capacity 
building. The resources (labour and machinery/equipment) used for constructing 
the Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in SSA are mainly imported from 
China with very little support to local manufacturing and limited capacity building. 
During negotiations with SSA governments, China ensures that it retains the 
flexibility to import project inputs from China. The approach of pegging financing 
to Chinese funding, to Chinese equipment and contractors, is part of the holistic 
approach by China to support Chinese manufacturers and expand its technology 
and influence.  
Perverse arguments: Related to the above, here critics effectively argue that 
the Chinese government and Chinese businesses pursue their own self-
interests. Pairault (2020) argues that the Chinese strategy or model of 
‘infrastructure-led growth’ seems to be showing its limits in Africa, where China 
has largely been instrumental in promoting it. Pairault argues that, whether or not 
Chinese investment is redundant in the host country, the ultimate beneficiary is 
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China. China maintains the supply of the goods and services that EPC projects 
require and keeps its GDP growing. For China, EPC projects procure suppliers 
from home – effectively ‘tying’ projects to arrangements in which recipients have 
no say. Fox (2019) agrees - although not an explicit (or deliberate) policy, China 
contributes to mounting debt in Africa. 
While the explanation for Chinese businesses’ preference for EPC models over 
IPPs is still emerging5, it is clear that the perceived convenience of the Chinese 
financing model may not necessarily guarantee transition to renewable energy 
sources and promote sustainable development in SSA power sectors. SSA 
implementation of IPPs was meant, in part, to reduce national burden and 
sustainable transition to renewable energy sources. Despite making significant 
contributions to energy generation, China-financed investment in the region has 
not made major impacts on either of the stated goals of governments in SSA. 
Policy makers in SSA appear to believe that Chinese-financed power generation 
investments are convenient, and even cheaper, compared to those by IPPs, but 
this needs a (re)evaluation as there are higher fiscal impacts on government 
cash flows, debt repayment, etc. By implementing the Chinese EPC model that 
requires national budget appropriation for debt repayment of Chinese-funded 
projects, SSA could indirectly implement policy reversals by provision of 
subsidies where revenue from the Chinese-funded projects is not sufficient for 
debt repayment. While recognising that the competitive model of power 
generation is not without limitations, the paper recommends increased 
involvement of Chinese investment in this model, with more diversification of 
Chinese investment portfolios towards modern renewables such wind and solar 
energy resources. 
 
5 It is also not yet clear whether it is the underlying limitations of many SSA counties such as inadequate 
policy signalling that has led Chinese businesses to opt for EPC projects. In some countries, for 
example, Ethiopia depended on hydropower for its power generation, and diversification to other 
renewables such as wind, solar, and geothermal is a relatively recent development.  
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 557 
Chinese-Funded Electricity Generation in Sub-Saharan Africa and Implications for Public 







Acker, K.; Brautigam, D. and Huang, Y. (2021) ‘The Pandemic has Worsened Africa’s Debt Crisis. 
China and Other Countries are Stepping In’, The Washington Post, February 26 (accessed 30 
September 2021) 
AfDB (2019) Estimating Investment Needs for the Power Sector in Africa 2016-2025, African 
Development Bank Group (accessed 30 September 2021) 
AfDB (2015) The New Deal on Energy for Africa: A Transformative Partnership to Light Up and 
Power Africa by 2025, Abidjan: African Development Bank Group (accessed 16 March 2021)  
Ayele, S.; Shen, W.; Chiyemura, F. and Gu, J. (2021) ‘Enhancing China–Africa Cooperation in the 
Renewable Energy Sector’, IDS Policy Briefing 176, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (accessed 
30 September 2021) 
Ayele, S. (2021) ‘The Resurgence of Agricultural Mechanisation in Ethiopia: Rhetoric or Real 
Commitment?’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2020.1847091 (accessed 30 
September 2021) 
Baker, L.; Shen, W. and Ayele, S. (2021, forthcoming) ‘Procurement of Renewable Electricity Amid Power 
Sectoral Reforms: A Comparative Review of China, South Africa and Ethiopia’ 
Blimpo, M.P. and Cosgrove-Davies, M. (2019) Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa. Uptake, 
Reliability, and Complementary Factors for Economic Impact, Africa Development Forum, Washington 
DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-
1361-0 (accessed 30 September 2021) 
Cabré, M.M.; Gallagher, K.P. and Li, Z. (2018) ‘Renewable Energy: The Trillion Dollar Opportunity for 
Chinese Overseas Investment’, China & World Economy 26.6: 27–49, DOI: 10.1111/cwe.12260 
(accessed 30 September 2021) 
Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué (2017) Our Shared Agenda for Global Action to Build Back 
Better, Cornwall: G7 (accessed 7 September 2021) 
Chen, W.; Dollar, D. and Tang, H. (2018) ‘Why is China Investing in Africa? Evidence from the Firm 
Level’, The World Bank Economic Review 32.3: 610–32, DOI: 10.1093/wber/lhw049 (accessed 30 
September 2021) 
China Africa Research Initiative (2021) China-Africa Trade, China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns 
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (accessed 20 September 2021) 
Chiyemura, F. (2019) ‘The Winds of Change in Africa–China Relations? Contextualising African 
Agency in Ethiopia-China Engagement in Wind Energy Infrastructure Financing and Development’, 
PhD dissertation, The Open University (accessed 30 September 2021) 
Coulibaly, B.S. (2021) Debt Sustainability and Financing for Development: A Key Post-COVID 
Challenge, Africa in Focus, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution (accessed 17 October 2021)  
Eberhard, A. Gratwick, K., Morella, E. and Antmann, P. (2017) ‘Independent Power Projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Investment Trends and Policy Lessons’, Energy Policy 108: 390–424, DOI: 
10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.023 (accessed 5 October 2021) 
Eberhard, A.; Gratwick, K.; Morella, E. and Antmann, P. (2016) Independent Power Projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa – Lessons from Five Key Countries, Washington DC: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (accessed 5 October 2021) 
Electricity Regulatory Authority (2021) Installed Capacity, Electricity Regulatory Authority, 28 January 
(accessed 20 September 2021) 
Fox, J. (2019) ‘Ethiopia and the Chinese Dream in Africa’, Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTE), 23 April 
(accessed 30 September 2021)  
Godinho, C. and Eberhard, A. (2019) Learning from Power Sector Reform Experiences: The Case of 
Uganda, Policy Research Working Paper 8820, Washington DC: Word Bank (accessed 30 September 
2021)  
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 557 
Chinese-Funded Electricity Generation in Sub-Saharan Africa and Implications for Public 






Gu, J. (2009) ‘China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development’, 
The European Journal of Development Research 21: 570–87, DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.21 (accessed 5 
October 2021) 
Gu, J.; Renwick, N. and Xue, L. (2018) ‘The BRICS and Africa's Search for Green Growth, Clean 
Energy and Sustainable Development’, Energy Policy 120: 675–83, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.05.028 
(accessed 5 October 2021) 
IEA (2020) World Energy Outlook 2020, Paris: International Energy Agency (accessed 30 September 
2021) 
IEA (2016) Boosting the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: China’s Involvement, IEA Partner 
Country Series, Paris: International Energy Agency (accessed 30 September 2021) 
IEA (2014) Africa Energy Outlook—a Focus on Energy Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, World 
Energy Outlook Special Report, Paris: International Energy Agency (accessed 30 September 2021) 
IRENA (2019) Scaling up Renewable Energy Deployment in Africa: Impact of IRENA’s Engagement, 
Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency (accessed 30 September 2021) 
IRENA and CEM (2015) Renewable Energy Auctions – A Guide to Design, Abu Dhabi: International 
Renewable Energy Agency (accessed 30 September 2021) 
Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2009) ‘Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large 
Dragons’, European Journal of Development Research 21: 551–69, DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.24 (accessed 
5 October 2021)  
Lema, R.; Bhamidipati, P.L.; Gregersen, C.; Hansen, U.E. and Kirchherr, J. (2021) ‘China’s Investments 
in Renewable Energy in Africa: Creating Co-benefits or just Cashing-in?’ World Development 
141.105365, DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105365 (accessed 5 October 2021) 
MEMD (2002) Energy Policy for Uganda, Kampala: The Republic of Uganda Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development 
Meyer, R.; Eberhard, A. and Gratwick, K. (2018) ‘Uganda’s Power Sector Reform: There and Back 
Again?’, Energy for Sustainable Development 43: 75–89, DOI: 10.1016/j.esd.2017.11.001 (accessed 5 
October 2021) 
MoFEC (2017) Public-Private Partnership Policy, Addis Ababa: The Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
Mohan, G. (2013) ‘Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Critical Political Economy of China and Africa’, 
Development and Change 44.6: 1255–72, DOI: 10.1111/dech.12061 (accessed 5 October 2021) 
MoWIE (2020) Ten Year (2013–2022 Ethiopian Calendar) Development Plan, Addis Ababa: The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy 
MoWIE (2019) National Electrification Program 2.0, Addis Ababa: The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy 
MoWIE (2018) National Energy Policy (Revised), Addis Ababa: The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy 
Pairault, T. (2020) ‘China’s Infrastructure-Heavy Model for Africa Growth is Failing’, The Diplomat, 30 
July (accessed 30 September 2021) 
Power Futures Lab (2020) Prospects for Private Power Investments in Sub-Saharan Africa in the New 
Decade, Cape Town: University of Cape Town (accessed 30 September 2021) 
Shen, W. (2020) ‘China’s Role in Africa’s Energy Transition: A Critical Review of its Intensity, 
Institutions, and Impacts’, Energy Research & Social Science 68.101578, DOI: 
10.1016/j.erss.2020.101578 (accessed 5 October 2021) 
Shen, W. and Power, M. (2017) ‘Africa and the Export of China’s Clean Energy Revolution’, Third 
World Quarterly 38.3: 678–97, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1199262 (accessed 5 October 2021) 
Shendy, R.; Kaplan, Z. and Mousley, P. (2011) Towards Better Infrastructure. Conditions, Constraints, 
and Opportunities in Financing Public-Private Partnerships in Selected African Countries, World 
Bank Study, Washington DC: World Bank (accessed 5 October 2021) 
Tan-Mullins, M.; Urban, F. and Mang, G. (2017) ‘Evaluating the Behaviour of Chinese Stakeholders 
Engaged in Large Hydropower Projects in Asia and Africa’, The China Quarterly 230: 464–88, DOI: 
10.1017/S0305741016001041 (accessed 5 October 2021) 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 557 
Chinese-Funded Electricity Generation in Sub-Saharan Africa and Implications for Public 






Teferra, M. (2002) ‘Power Sector Reforms in Ethiopia: Options for Promoting Local Investments in 
Rural Electrification’, Energy Policy 30: 967–75, DOI: 10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00051-4 (accessed 5 
October 2021) 
Tesfamichael, M.; Mulugetta, Y.; Beyene, A.D. and Sebsibie, S. (2021) ‘Counting the Cost: Coping with 
Tariff Increases Amidst Power Supply Shortfalls in Urban Households in Ethiopia’, Energy Research 
& Social Science 71.101860, DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2020.101860 (accessed 30 September 2021) 
UBOS (2020) Statistical Abstract, Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (accessed 17 October 2021)  
UBOS (2018) Energy for Rural Transformation (ERT III) Survey – Uganda, Kampala: Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 
UNECA (2014) Economic Report on Africa 2014: Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa, Addis Ababa: 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (accessed 30 September 2021)  
Wamukonya, N. (2005) ‘Power Sector Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Lessons’, Economic and 
Political Weekly 40.50: 5302–8 (accessed 30 September 2021) 
World Bank (2018) Environmental and Social Systems Assessment (ASSA) for the Ethiopian 




















Delivering world-class research, learning and teaching that 
transforms the knowledge, action and leadership needed for 
more equitable and sustainable development globally. 
Institute of Development Studies 
Library Road  
Brighton, BN1 9RE 
United Kingdom 
+44 (0)1273 606261 
ids.ac.uk 
Charity Registration Number 306371 
Charitable Company Number 877338 
© Institute of Development Studies 2021 
 
